A Practical Enquiry into the Philosophy of EducationGall, James
Philosophy
A Practical Enquiry into the Philosophy of Education
Gall, James
Education
The second remark which we would here make is, that Nature, in most
cases, appears to put much more value on the inferences, or lessons,
drawn from the knowledge we have acquired, than she does upon the
knowledge itself. For example, in the case of the infant burning its
finger, the circumstance itself will soon be forgotten; but the
inference, or the impression acquired by its means, will remain. And
when at any subsequent period it avoids fire or flame, its mind is not
so much occupied by the abstract truth that flame will burn, as by the
lesson learned from that truth, that it should not meddle with it. This
inference it now practically applies to its present situation. That the
abstract truth,--the knowledge originally derived from the fact,--is
included in the lesson, may be quite true; but what we wish at present
more particularly to point out is, that _it is seldom adverted to by the
infant_. The inference,--the lesson which the truth suggested,--is all
that the child thought of. That alone is the fabric which Nature has
been employed in rearing; and the original truth has been used merely as
scaffolding for the purpose. The edifice itself, accordingly, having
been completed, the scaffolding is allowed to fall, as having answered
its design.
The same conclusion may be come to, by attending to the circumstances
connected with the operation of the principle in adults.--The person who
returned for his great-coat or umbrella after having drawn the inference
from the appearance of the sky, thought only of the coming shower; and
we could easily suppose a case, where the original indication of the sky
might be totally forgotten, while the full impression that it would rain
might still continue. In like manner, the mariner, in the bustle of
preparation, thinks only of the dreaded storm, while the original
circumstance,--the knowledge from which the inference was drawn,--is now
unheeded, or entirely forgotten.
The other circumstance to which we would here solicit attention, as
proving the same thing, is one to which we formerly alluded. It is the
remarkable fact, that knowledge, of whatever kind, when it is practised,
becomes more and more familiar and useful; while that which is not acted
upon, is soon blotted from the memory and lost. Writing, arithmetic, and
spelling, not to speak of grammar, geography, and history, when not
exercised in after life, are frequently found of no avail, even at times
when they are specially required.--Why is this? They were once known.
The knowledge was communicated at a time when the mind and memory were
best fitted for receiving and retaining them. But Nature in this, as in
every other instance, has been true to herself; and the knowledge which
is not used has been blighted, and at last removed from the memory and
lost.
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