A Practical Enquiry into the Philosophy of EducationGall, James
Philosophy
A Practical Enquiry into the Philosophy of Education
Gall, James
Education
From all these circumstances taken together, we are led to conclude,
that Nature never conveys knowledge without intending it to be
used;--that by a principle in our constitution, which we have
denominated "common sense," Nature prompts even infants to employ their
knowledge for their own special benefit;--that this principle continues
invariably to act, till it is assisted or superseded by reason;--and
that the process consists in drawing inferences, or lessons, from known
facts, and in practically applying them to present circumstances. All
which points the Educationist directly to the conclusion, that the
communication of knowledge is one of the _means_, but not the _end_, of
education;--that the lessons derived from the knowledge communicated,
are infinitely more valuable than the knowledge itself;--and that the
great design of education is, and ought to be, to train the young to
know how to use, and to put to use, not only the knowledge communicated
at school, but all the knowledge which they may acquire in their future
journey through life.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] Note F.
CHAP. X.
_On Nature's Method of applying Knowledge by means of the Moral Sense,
or Conscience._
Nature enables her pupils to apply knowledge by means of the moral
sense, or conscience, as well as by the animal, or common sense. There
is however this great difference in the manner in which they
operate,--that whereas every infringement of the natural or physical
laws which regulate the application of knowledge by what we have called
the common sense, is invariably followed by its proper punishment,--the
consequences of infringing the laws which regulate the moral sense, are
neither so immediate, nor at the time so apparent. The child knows, that
by putting his finger to the candle, burning and pain will instantly
follow;--but the evil consequences of purloining sweet-meats, or telling
a lie to avoid punishment, are not so obvious. Does Nature then put less
value on moral integrity, than on worldly prudence? Certainly not. But
in the latter case she deals with man more as a physical and
intellectual being; and in the former, as a moral, a responsible, and an
immortal being. The lower animals to a great extent participate with us
in the benefits arising from attention to the laws which govern physical
enjoyments; but they know nothing of a moral sense, which is peculiar to
intelligent and accountable creatures. From this we may safely conclude,
that the application of knowledge by means of the moral sense, or
conscience, is of infinitely more importance to man than the application
of his knowledge by the animal, or common sense.
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