A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at OmdurmanNeufeld, Charles
History
A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman
Neufeld, Charles
Neufeld, Charles, 1856-1918; Prisoners -- Sudan -- Omdurman; Sudan -- History -- 19th century
Under pretence of intending to submit, Gumaa gained time, and tried
to hurry up reinforcements, but this having been suspected, Zoghal
ordered Slatin, Tandal, the President of the Civil Court, Aly Bey
Ibrahim-el-Khabir, Slatin’s head-clerk Ahmad Riad, and a few others,
to send in an ultimatum to Gumaa, |320| and await his reply. The
reply travelled quickly; as soon as he read the letter, Gumaa opened
fire upon the spot where Slatin and his companions were awaiting him.
During the first siege of El Fasher, Gumaa must have accounted for at
least fifteen thousand dervishes, and utterly defeated the army which
retired to Walad Birra, from whence a party was sent off to Dara to
bring up the ammunition which, as appears from Gordon’s Journal, was
handed over to the Mahdists by Slatin when he surrendered the province.
This occupied eleven days, and then the second siege was laid. The
wells were filled up, thus depriving the garrison of water; but for
seven or eight days they held out, dying of thirst, while the town was
constantly bombarded with Government ammunition. Said Bey Gumaa has
always protested that had it not been for the ammunition handed over by
Slatin to the Mahdists he could have held out—and more.
The knowledge of these things must have influenced Gordon, especially
when Slatin writes to him, through Consul Hansal, offering to place
his services at his disposal, but only on condition that Gordon
should guarantee never to surrender, for, if he did, Slatin would
be maltreated by the Mahdists when they laid hands upon him. Gordon
was the best judge as to the value of services offered under such
conditions. For “moral and political reasons,” Gordon considered
it unadvisable to have anything whatever to do with what he called
“apostate” Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, but appreciating the
enormous responsibility |321| thrown upon his shoulders, he appealed
to the Ulema for their advice, as these apostates were now their
co-religionists, and they decided to have nothing whatever to do with
their “proposals of treachery,” as no good could come of it. Matters
were made still worse by Slatin writing to Gordon asking him to be a
party to proceedings very foreign indeed to Gordon’s nature at all
events. Slatin’s request to Gordon was to write to him personally one
letter in French, and another letter in Arabic, “asking him to obtain
permission from his Master to come to Omdurman and discuss with him the
conditions of his (Gordon’s) surrender,” which letter he could use in
order to obtain permission to come to Omdurman. If Gordon had written
that Arabic letter. . . .
If all these facts were not known to Father Ohrwalder before 1892, six
years is quite long enough time to have learned them, and now I have
no hesitation in saying that to assert that Gordon brought about his
downfall by refusing the services of people willing to risk their lives
in reaching him is, to put it charitably, pure fiction.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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