Applying this fact to piece work, one sees at once how serious differences may arise. A job is priced at, say, 1s. An average man whose rate is 40s. a week will earn about 50s. a week on that job by diligent work. Then a really first-class man comes along and earns 80s. What follows? "If Smith can earn 80s., it is evident that the price is too high and the other workers are slacking!" That is the natural argument of the employer, and down comes the rate. Cutting rates is one of the most frequent sources of trouble on piece work, but it cannot be avoided. The worker knows that the rates will be cut, and therefore two methods of defence are open to him: First, he always works slowly on a job until it has been priced. In this way a good price is obtained, a price which enables the slowest worker to earn his wages--and a bit above--easily. Second, the worker takes care not to earn too much. It is arranged between the men how much each ought to take on a certain job, and the arrangement made is carried out. This is, of course, dishonest, but it is necessary. For suppose a good worker comes on the job and does his best, the price comes down to everybody, and the average man cannot earn his wages. The good man is therefore compelled to be dishonest to his employer or unfair to his fellow-worker. And, again, in piece work all prices are arbitrary. Even if one shop gives a reasonable price, other shops in the same line of business find it out, and put on a lower price in order to reduce works costs and thereby lower prices to customers, which means snatching the trade from the good shop. Thus, the circumstances of the old-fashioned piece work method and the dishonesty of both parties to it lead to misunderstandings and dissatisfaction. (_c_) PROFIT SHARING. There are various methods of increasing earnings by profit sharing. The employer, from motives which may be good or bad from the standpoint of the worker, desires to present the worker with a certain proportion of the net profit. In some cases the motive is entirely for the worker's good; in others it is for the purpose of getting the worker to stay with the firm, and to make his interest so large that he dare not be independent in case he should lose his profit. This means that the employer is no longer troubled with strikes and labour disturbances. However, it is the effects that concern us here, and not the motives. Under profit sharing the profit is paid out or credited to the worker every six or twelve months, and one must be employed for a certain length of time before one comes under the scheme. So that it holds out little incentive to efficiency until the worker has been with the firm for some years; until then his interest is so small that only the naturally thrifty workers are interested in it.