But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will. The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered. The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects. It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of modification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every _nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and accountable. Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations. The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations. The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities would lie dormant without the reason.