A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the
will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in
itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and
sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without
rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing
what to do.
It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing
peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to
necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_
feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given
its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has
awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is
as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a
power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power
which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.
It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason
and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason
or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such
relation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be
called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of
will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing,
bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however,
frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention,
and which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be
required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting
one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and
sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily
determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection,
and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general
motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to
illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to
prove that the will can act without a motive.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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