A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the
chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a
selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?
The illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected,
and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the
sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the
absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at
illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this
selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency
as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the
reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no
affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as
most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.
It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of
Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_
a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very
beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if
this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in
a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are
so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that
they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the
other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and
death." (p. 73.)
Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the
sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state
of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of
indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his
system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment
volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in
indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest
ceases with motion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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