II. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, "No future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without _evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3. Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or _proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore, whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its nature."