But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in _anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He illustrates his meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.) The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent event exists "_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet have sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own volitions.