A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
The ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain
and reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are
never without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the
individual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of
the individual volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible
existence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and
constitution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not
required to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions
may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual
existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition;
he cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough,
as I have already shown, to assign him prescience, in order to bring
within his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows
all the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the
possible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that class of
the actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively
necessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring up under
the characteristic of contingency.
And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine
prescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the
contingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far
otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the
planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the
comets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions
of the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations.
But if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable
calculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something "that is
evident" and "now existent, with which the future existence of the
_contingent_ event is connected."
There are three kinds of certainty. _First_, absolute certainty. This is
the certainty which lies in necessary and eternal principles e. g. 2 x
2=4; the existence of space; every body must be in space; every
phenomenon must have a cause; the being of God.
Logical certainty, that is, the connexion between premises and
conclusion, is likewise absolute.
_Secondly_. Physical certainty. This is the certainty which lies in the
connexion between physical causes and their phenomena: e. g.
gravitation, heat, chemical affinities in general, mechanical forces.
The reason conceives of these causes as inherently active and uniform;
and hence, wherever a physical cause exists, we expect its proper
phenomena.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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