"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called _reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_, all things being put together which relates to the mind's present perceptions in any respect." (p. 25.) The "large sense" in which Edwards takes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive being. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable, the suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with other particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject to the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at the moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is not enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must likewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of the most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this sense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the subject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, "the act of the will is determined in opposition to it." (ibid.) "Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence." After having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained the cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion between this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this connexion a necessary connexion? In order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he proceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above title. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary discussion. Edwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the common or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or metaphysical use.