Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which "does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation. (p. 34.) Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before, such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.)