Edwards adopts what he calls the "original" and "proper," meaning of power, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, "in the ordinary use of language," as the legitimate and true meaning. In this use, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition with its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or motives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, "to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability," or to the want of motives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) "is not just," "because the thing wanting," that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, "is not a being _able_," that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral ability, "but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the act of volition, or the fact of 'being willing,'" there is no facility of mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state of mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no concern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which can be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability to do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but still if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition and the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the thing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be able to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him. We can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those motives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not _unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of the word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the volition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made; still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our actual volitions and their objects. "Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency."