From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, "It will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no _will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its will_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not to speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a will_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of." (p. 38.) Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity of choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded connexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those volitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_ is the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and whose choice reaches effects. _Moral Agent._ "A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a _moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty." (p. 39.) In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality? "To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to moral faculty." (p. 40.)