He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination, --"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself. It plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The _metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do _we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_ Nor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist. The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind, and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency, responsibility, and duty.