In relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple fact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established antecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects, because he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear, because he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common judgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness, that an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which ought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a volition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong, because it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be rewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition. In vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea of _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends the sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has all the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but a willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do nothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which goes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his effort. In vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground of moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_ necessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne to do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been wanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil, anything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under any responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to be tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of, could admit the plea--"I did not the good because I had not the will to do it," or "I did the evil because I had the will to do it." "This is your guilt," would be the reply of the judge, "that you had no will to do the good--that you had a will to do the evil." We must now take up a different class of deductions. They are such as those abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of morality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If however they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against them. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do most firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for himself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_. I. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional necessity, particular and general. 1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the individual.