A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can
act.
VII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an
effort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course
cannot resist his passions, or introduce any intellectual or moral
discipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake
any enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged,
or not part or consequent of the same.
If he effect any change directly in the habitual character of his
volitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, he must will different
from his actual will,--his will must oppose itself in its own act: but
this is absurd, the system itself being judge. As, therefore, the will
cannot oppose itself, a new volition can be obtained only by presenting
a new motive; but this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is
to call up new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state
of the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering
under the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself must be
changed in relation to the objects now before it; or a change must take
place both of subject and object, for the motive lies in the correlation
of the two. But the volition to call up new objects and circumstances in
relation to some principle of the mind that had been slumbering,--for
example, fear, must itself have a motive; but the motive to call up
objects of fear must preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then
of necessity the volition to call up objects of fear will take place;
and, it will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the
actually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such motive
pre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a new motive, to
cause the choice of objects of fear; and here would be a recurrence of
the original difficulty,--and so on, ad infinitum.
If the problem be to effect a change in the state of the mind in
relation to existing objects, in the first place, this cannot be
effected by a direct act of will, for the act of will is caused by the
state of mind, and this would be an effect changing or annihilating its
cause.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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