The Brussels experts did not feel themselves free to consider an average payment less than that contemplated at Boulogne. They recommended to the Allied Governments, accordingly, (1) that during the five years from 1921 to 1926 Germany should pay an _average_ annuity of $750,000,000, but that this average annuity should be so spread over the five years that less than this amount would be payable in the first two years and more in the last two years, the question of the amount of subsequent payments, after the expiry of five years, being postponed for the present; (2) That a substantial part of this sum should be paid in the form of deliveries of material and not of cash; (3) That the annual expenses of the Armies of Occupation should be limited to $60,000,000, which payment need not be additional to the above annuities but a first charge on them; (4) That the Allies should waive their claim on Germany to build ships for them and should perhaps relinquish, or postpone, the claim for the delivery of a certain number of the existing German vessels; (5) That Germany on her side should put her finances and her budget in order and should agree to the Allies taking control of her customs in the event of default under the above scheme. IV. _The Decisions of Paris_ (_January_ 24–30, 1921) The suggestions of the Brussels experts furnished no permanent settlement of the question, but they represented, nevertheless, a great advance from the ideas of the Treaty. In the meantime, however, opinion in France was rising against the concessions contemplated. M. Leygues, it appeared, would be unable to carry in the Chamber the scheme discussed at Boulogne. Prolonged political intrigue ended in the succession of M. Briand to the Premiership, with the extreme defenders of the literal integrity of the Treaty of Versailles, M. Poincaré, M. Tardieu, and M. Klotz, still in opposition. The projects of Boulogne and Brussels were thrown into the melting–pot, and another conference was summoned to meet at Paris at the end of January 1921.