1. The fate of Upper Silesia is highly relevant to some of the conclusions about coal in Chapter IV of _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (pp. 77–84). I there stated that “German authorities claim, not without contradiction, that to judge from the votes cast at elections, one–third of the population would elect in the Polish interest, and two–thirds in the German,” which forecast turned out to be in almost exact accordance with the facts. I also urged that, unless the plebiscite went in a way which I did not expect, the industrial districts ought to be assigned to Germany. But I felt no confidence, having regard to the policy of France, that this would be done; and I allowed, therefore, in my figures for the possibility that Germany would lose this area. The actual decision of the Allies, acting on the advice of the Council of the League of Nations to whom the matter had been referred, which we have discussed briefly above (pp. 12–14), divides the industrial triangle between the two claimants to it. According to an estimate of the Prussian Ministry of Trade 86 per cent of the total coal deposits of Upper Silesia fall to Poland, leaving 14 per cent to Germany. Germany retains a somewhat larger proportion of pits in actual operation, 64 per cent of the current production of coal falling to Poland and 36 per cent to Germany.[25] The figure of 100,000,000 tons, given in _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ for the _net_ German production (_i.e._, deducting consumption at the mines themselves) in the near future _excluding_ Upper Silesia, should, therefore, be replaced by the figure of (say) 115,000,000 tons, _including_ such part of Upper Silesia as Germany is now to retain.