A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquest — John Shaqi
A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquestDillon, Emile Joseph
History
A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquest
Dillon, Emile Joseph
Germany -- Foreign relations; World War, 1914-1918
But although for years I and some few others had been preaching the
imminence of this danger which no diplomatic arguments could exorcize,
the bulk of the British nation hoped on, refusing to impute to the
German people the motives or the aims which we knew it entertained.
In the _Contemporary Review_[3] I was attacked by the celebrated
Professor Hans Delbrück for affirming, as I have done for over twenty
years, that Germany was concentrating all her efforts on the coming
struggle between herself and this country, and the learned Professor
did me the honour to say that so long as I was allowed to express my
views on foreign politics in the _Contemporary Review_ there would and
could be no entente between Great Britain and Germany. “As long as Mr.
Dillon is permitted,” this German Professor and successor of Treitschke
wrote, “to set forth in the _Contemporary Review_ his fantastic views,
engendered by hatred and suspicion, about German policy, all those will
be working in vain who believe that peace between our nations can be
secured by arbitration treaties.”[4] I then summed up my opinions as
follows:
When I read the smooth-tongued, plausible panegyrics on Germany’s
politics, which are served up to us here in England every year, and
contrast them with the systematic aggressiveness which everybody
with open eyes and ears sees and hears in Berlin, I behold Germany
rise before me in the form of a cuttlefish, with many lasso-like
arms, ever ready to seize their unsuspecting prey, and also ready,
when itself is in danger, to shed an ink-like fluid which blackens
the water and hinders effective pursuit.
Everything that has come to pass since then offers a pointed
illustration of that presentment. The attempt to obtain without a war
a return for her outlay on her army and navy by calling for coveted
territory as a propitiatory sacrifice was energetically made during
the Morocco crisis. But the spring of the Panther failed of its
purpose. Germany’s further experiences during the London Conference
were likewise discouraging. The loose ranks of the Entente Powers
closed up at the approach of herself and her ally, and Albania proved
a mere torso. Then the supreme effort was put forth a few weeks
back, and the Berlin Government, alive to the possibility of a like
unfruitful result, determined to abide by and prepare for the extreme
consequences, which, sooth to say, appeared to them less formidable
than they really were.
Congruously with this resolve every precautionary measure that
prudence prompted or circumstance suggested was adopted betimes, some
secret, others public.
For the behoof of the European public the former were flatly denied,
and the latter glibly explained away.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account