A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquest — John Shaqi
A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquestDillon, Emile Joseph
History
A scrap of paper : $b The inner history of German diplomacy and her scheme of world-wide conquest
Dillon, Emile Joseph
Germany -- Foreign relations; World War, 1914-1918
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Russia had no secrets whatever
from the agents, diplomatic and military, of the German Government.
Every intrigue that was woven, every scheme that was laid before the
various State departments in Petrograd, every casual remark dropped by
the Tsar in the intimacy of private life to a courtier, every real or
supposed weakness in the Imperial defences, was carefully reported,
with all the local anecdotic embroidery, and duly taken cognizance
of in Berlin. Among high officials there were some who, without evil
intent, but solely in virtue of what they honestly but foolishly
regarded as the privilege of private friendship, were wont to unburden
themselves of momentous State secrets to certain representatives of
the Empire with which Russia is now at war. These representatives were
made aware of the advice tendered to the Tsar by his Majesty’s trusted
advisers in various critical emergencies, and they announced it to
their chiefs, the Tsar’s present enemies. There was, for instance, a
few years ago, one influential Russian statesman without whose assent
the Government would undertake nothing of real importance, a patriot
whose leanings towards Austria and Germany were natural and frankly
proclaimed. In the interests of his country, which he identified
with the triumph of his own particular party, this Russian laid bare
many matters to the Austrian Ambassador, then Baron Aehrenthal, who,
being himself an Austrian of the same political school of thought,
warmly sympathized with his friend, and also took due note of his
friend’s confidences. That, it is asserted, was the main source of
Aehrenthal’s spirited policy. He believed he knew Russia’s weak points,
and relied on their handicapping the diplomacy of the Tsar. And then
his countrymen ascribed to military weakness the concessions which the
Russian Government made for the sake of European peace.
I can affirm that certain State documents, which I could, if necessary,
describe, were in this way conveyed to the future enemy, and that one
of these, together with all the facts and figures adduced therein
as proofs, contributed materially to Germany’s decision to present
her ultimatum to Russia, by convincing her that that Empire would not
venture to take up the challenge. I make this statement with first-hand
knowledge. Thus Russian ingenuousness and candour have played their
part--certainly a material part--in bringing down a frightful calamity
on that nation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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