As soon as the Balkan troubles began (they write), Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Serbs had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them, and that they must do all in their power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great Power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping with their ally perfect faith and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honour and success. Now, it was clear in Berlin that, in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Servia, and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, but that, after her recent defeat, seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a _defensive_ nature, led to the great German military Bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength. These preparations, America is informed, “were merely meant to protect us against, and to prepare us for, the attacks of Moscovite barbarism.” But Russia’s incipient army reorganization--which cannot have been very thorough, seeing that in spite of it the German Government regarded the Russian army as incapable of taking the field--is cited as evidence of malice prepense.[5] Disingenuousness could hardly go further. Any experienced European statesman would have divined this plan even without a concrete clue. I knew it, and exposed it in the columns of the _Daily Telegraph_. CHAPTER III THE PLAN AND ITS EXECUTION