It was at this period that I went on board one of the finest battleships in the harbour and conversed with one of the officers of the fleet on the probability of war. In his opinion war would be avoided; but after some argument, he admitted that war was possible. “But we will not fight,” he added significantly. I was so astonished at this remarkable assertion, that I asked him if he did not mean that Russia would not make war. “I mean we, the navy, will not fight,” he repeated. “Of course, as you say, the Japanese may make war; I may be killed even, but we will not fight.” He spake calmly, even sadly, and soon brought the conversation politely to a termination. As events proved, the officer was right, and particularly right with regard to that ship, which of all the fleet was probably poorest in defence, and never once attacked. The Russian military authorities knew that war threatened, and made such preparations as they could in anticipation of an early outbreak of hostilities. If men and stores in excess of usual movements had been directed towards Manchuria, the act would have been construed by the Japanese as indicating a hostile intent, and of itself would have constituted a _casus belli_. To increase very materially the military force at the disposal of the Viceroy would have incommoded him seriously in dealing with the Japanese contentions. War could have been diverted, or at least delayed, if Russia had promptly abandoned her aggressive policy in the Far East, if only for a time. As it was the “Forward” party had attempted too much on the slight military resources at their disposal in Manchuria. Opinions differ as to the number of troops east of Lake Baikal in January last. From information I obtained, the Russians had increased their force during the autumn of 1903 by about 50,000 men; they had in Manchuria and eastern Siberia, in the month of January, about 200,000 men, which force was being increased by new arrivals to the average number of 400 men every day. This force was distributed as follows:--