A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the EncheiridionEpictetus
Philosophy
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
Epictetus
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers (and
say): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing; our wall is
secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources.
These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable; but
nothing else than his opinions makes a man’s soul impregnable. For what
wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so
safe, or what honor (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man’s
opinions)? All (other) things everywhere are perishable, easily taken
by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be
disturbed, except what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires
disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not
choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us,
and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is
perishable and servile and to labor at the things which are
imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man
either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man’s opinions
about each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him;
this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made
Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which
they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is
the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the
nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him
who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and
treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. For
nothing is more akin to us than the good; therefore, if these things
(externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons,
nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of
enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will ([Greek:
proairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is
the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the
only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about
what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom?
with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the
chief things?
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very
ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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