A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion — John Shaqi
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the EncheiridionEpictetus
Philosophy
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
Epictetus
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.—When a man holds his proper
station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do
you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid
conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object
as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why
then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has
always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who
follow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom
you wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say
that they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?
ON PRÆCOGNITIONS.—Præcognitions are common to all men, and præcognition
is not contradictory to præcognition. For who of us does not assume
that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we
ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that
Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction
arise? It arises in the adaptation of the præcognitions to the
particular cases. When one man says, “He has done well; he is a brave
man,” and another says, “Not so; but he has acted foolishly,” then the
disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the
Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should
be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but
whether it is holy to eat pig’s flesh or not holy. You will find this
dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What
do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and
right? “Certainly.” Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit
that what is good ought to be done? “I do most certainly.” Adapt your
præcognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins.
Agamemnon says, “I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father.”
Achilles says, “You ought.” It is certain that one of the two makes a
wrong adaptation of the præcognition of “ought” or “duty.” Further,
Agamemnon says, “Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I
take his prize from some of you.” Achilles replies, “Would you then
take her whom I love?” “Yes, her whom you love.” “Must I then be the
only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has
no prize?” Thus the dispute begins.
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