A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the EncheiridionEpictetus
Philosophy
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
Epictetus
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS.—Solitude
is a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone,
he is not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is among
numbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost
either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to
repose, we say that we are left solitary, though we are often in Rome,
though such a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, and
sometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is
solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and
exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this reason when we travel,
then especially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among
robbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes us
from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and
helpful to us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may
say that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration and bewails himself
saying, Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor
Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what
some say that he does when he is alone at the conflagration. For they
do not understand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because
they set out from a certain natural principle, from the natural desire
of community and mutual love and from the pleasure of conversation
among men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a manner for
this also (being alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to
be his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil
by himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and
is employed in thoughts suitable to himself; so ought we also to be
able to talk with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not
to be unprovided with the means of passing our time; to observe the
divine administration, and the relation of ourselves to everything
else; to consider how we formerly were affected towards things that
happened and how at present; what are still the things which give us
pain; how these also can be cured and how removed; if any things
require improvement, to improve them according to reason.
Well then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murder
me? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body.
What kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselves
worse than children; and what do children do when they are left alone?
They take up shells and ashes, and they build something, then pull it
down, and build something else, and so they never want the means of
passing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep,
because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I then have no
shells, no ashes? But children do what they do through want of thought
(or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowledge are unhappy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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