A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the EncheiridionEpictetus
Philosophy
A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
Epictetus
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do
not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout,
ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of everything
which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that
anything which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how
is a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud?
Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And
who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No
man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true?
No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally
free. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object
or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do
anything, which of you can do this, unless he has received an
impression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No
man. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered
and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for
good here.
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT
IN OUR POWER.—Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an
evil to you; for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with
others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a
man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault; for God
has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this
purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his
own, and other things not as his own; some things subject to hindrance
and compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man’s own;
but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and
the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes
care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. But you
say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. Why did he
consider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he looked
on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are a mortal,
that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country?
Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you
or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not
thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing,
you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would
always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you
sit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in
the same places. Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than
crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and
changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without
lamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, but this happens
to them because they are irrational creatures.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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