satisfy my mind; and therefore I come to a determination to be more thoroughly persuaded of their truth, if possible, or else be more thoroughly convinced of their fallacy. With this motive I entered on the present controversy; and I feel very happy in its termination, having been much strengthened in my faith thereby, and humbly pray, that should it ever come before the public, it may be blest to the benefit of others. "2d. What you have said on the divine mission, &c. of the apostles is satisfactory. For although it has not fully come to my question, yet it has had the same good effect by convincing me that my question went a little beyond the bounds of reason; for it was too much like asking a blind man how it is that other men see! It is not reasonable to suppose that the apostles themselves could have informed persons who were uninspired to their understanding, how or by what means, they were inspired. It was sufficient to demonstrate the fact by the works which they were enabled to perform, (admitting the account true,) in the name of JESUS. "3d. My argument respecting a hope of future existence has been extended rather beyond my design. Without taking up time to recapitulate, I will only say I admit the truth of your argument on this subject; neither do I see how it stands altogether in opposition to mine. What I contend for is this. The idea of non-existence, i.e. of existing only in God, without retaining our individual consciousness of being, does not, like the idea of endless misery, absolutely destroy our present comforts. It only cuts short, or else prevents, future prospects. If it can be demonstrated, as I believe it can, that God is good to the animal creation, in giving them existence, on the supposition, that they have no future state, I contend that man is equally, if not more abundantly blessed, even on the same supposition.--But I never meant to contend that eternal life would not be still infinitely better, according to our conceptions of good, if true. To state a case, which will illustrate in some degree my ideas of this subject, the following may come something nigh it; viz. I should be pleased with the idea of living, say, ten years, in reference only to the blessing of this life, although I might know I should die at that time, provided that, during the ten years, I should enjoy the common blessings of life. This does not prevent my desiring to live longer; neither does a certain knowledge that I shall not prevent me from desiring to live, nor from being pleased with the idea of living, till that time. But let me know for a certainty, or, which would be the same thing to me, let me absolutely believe that I should live fifty years, and that although the ten first would be attended with all the common blessings of life, as usual, yet that the remaining forty years, which would be the remaining whole of my natural life, I should be placed in the most distressed and aggravated