circumstances, of which I could possibly conceive; now, in reference to the whole fifty years, could I desire to live? No! I say, I rather choose instant death! "When I look around on the circumstances and condition of men, I am so fully convinced that the aggregate of happiness so far overbalances the aggregate of misery, that I am firmly of opinion, yea, I do not entertain the least possible doubt of its truth, and therefore think I ever shall contend, that this life is a blessing, and we have abundant reason to be very thankful for it, without the least reference to a future state. But, nevertheless, I am very ready to admit, that, when futurity and immortality are taken into the account, and are connected with the same view of the character of the Deity, these blessings are all extended and magnified to infinity. "But on the supposition that truth is any where connected with _endless misery_, the scene is wholly changed. On this supposition I am not reconciled to truth at all; I can find nothing in my moral nature, which I call good, but what stands directly opposed to it; Hence, the very brightest and most brilliant part of the picture is deformed by the awful idea; it takes away all the pleasure of investigation, and if this be truth, my only desire and prayer to God, is that I might be permitted to remain eternally ignorant of it! It is my confidence therefore in the goodness of the truth, and this only, which has reconciled my mind to it. You may contend that I have not obtained this confidence without the knowledge of divine revelation. Be that as it may; on this supposition only I am reconciled, and something must destroy this confidence before I can become unreconciled to truth. I think now I must be fully understood, and will therefore add no more on this subject. "4th. What you say under the fourth article is satisfactory. Errors, no doubt, may be, and often are committed by applying instructions 'differently from their primary design.' "5th. Your remarks under the sixth article are very judicious. Much injury no doubt is often done to the truth of divine revelation by contending so tenaciously as some do for things, which, if true, are not essential to its support.--It is often the case that, by trying to prove too much, we weaken the evidence, in the minds of many, respecting the main thing we wish to establish. Hence, the opposer, not being able, or else not disposed, to make proper distinction, considers it all of one piece; and not being able to see the propriety of many things, which are contended for with equal zeal, sets the whole down as a fallacy.