time, those evidences would naturally lose their force when communicated to others and finally lose their strength. Let us suppose a case. A man shall have a vision of the night, in which it shall be revealed to him that some time before the present generation shall leave the stage of life, the kingdom of Great Britain will be overcome by the power of France; that very many of the flourishing cities of England will be destroyed in a very awful manner; that London will be laid level with the ground; that the distress of the inhabitants during the siege will be extreme; that for some time before this great event, there will be wars and rumors of wars among the nations, and certain signs very wonderful will be seen in the heavens. This man tells his vision very circumstantially and several persons write it down. Now suppose as the time passes away, these events, one after another, should take place, all in the same order in which the vision represented them; do you feel willing to say that the evidences of the truth of this vision, are all the time losing their force? No surely they are not; they are all the time gaining strength and waxing brighter. Whether I am able to satisfy you that the above case is a fair representation of the evidences of divine revelation, or not, it discovers in some degree the ground on which, in my mind, revelation is established. Compare, if you please, the prophesy of Jesus recorded in the 24th of Matthew, with the history of the events of which the divine messenger spake. Yours, &c. H. BALLOU. P. S. You have noticed, no doubt, in a parenthesis, that I do not allow your argument on the dissimilarity of divine revelation and principles of nature to have any force to do away the argument of our brother, to which you replied. It was evidently not his design to argue a similarity between the nature of these widely different subjects, but to show that no greater partiality appears in the divine wisdom, in not discovering the truths of revelation in all ages, to all nations and in all languages, than in its not leading the human mind to the discovery of electricity or any other of the laws of nature in the same manner. Will you endeavour to maintain that the divine economy has nothing to do in directing means and circumstances to the developement of the laws of nature and to the discovery of useful inventions? And if you allow it has, why do you not assign a reason why these discoveries should not have been made in all ages, to all nations, and written or rather _printed_, in all languages that cannot as well be applied in the other case? In this way you would do away his reasoning and my own likewise, for as you notice, we were both of one mind on this subject.