"You say I have acknowledged that a divine revelation 'if real, is of all truths the most important;' hence you call upon the 'eye of reason' to examine this proposition to see why it should be considered more important than the discoveries made in the arts and sciences, &c. I think these questions may be easily and correctly answered. One relates to the blessings of _eternity_; and the others to those only of _time_; hence if the truths manifested by a revelation had been of no more importance to man than the truths in natural philosophy, reason would say, God would have left them also to be discovered, if discovered at all, like all other truths, without a special revelation. But, you must excuse me for not being able to see the force and conclusiveness of your reasoning, when you say that my 'allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason, an argument in its support.' Supposing I am informed of a large estate bequeathed to me by some benefactor. I acknowledge that it is very important to me, if true, as I am in great need; yet I do not believe it true. Now, is my acknowledging its importance, if true, an argument in support of its truth? If it is so, the reason of it is out of my sight. "I should think that the reason of man (the only reason with which we are acquainted) would hardly undertake to say whether a revelation is either necessary or not necessary. The only evidence that reason can have of its necessity is its truth; and a supposition that it is not true equally supposes it not to be necessary. For to suppose otherwise supposes that God has omitted something which was necessary to be done! Try the matter as it respects a new revelation. Who will undertake to say that a new revelation either is or is not necessary? No one who believes in a revelation will deny the possibility of such an event. Suppose then for the moment it is true; and something is brought to light infinitely more glorious than any thing of which the human mind has yet conceived; will any one say it is unimportant? Or is the 'allowing it any importance--an argument in its support?' "I am very ready to allow that a 'divinely munificent Creator would not omit any thing which is of importance to his intelligent creatures:' and on this ground I admitted the _importance_ of revelation 'if real;' but I am yet unable to see how this is any argument in its support. It seems to me that this argument might be turned right the other way with equal force. If revelation be not true, it is not necessary it should be; and man can be made just as happy in this world by knowing all that he can know without it, as those are who believe in it; and admitting it not true there is no more importance in all the stories about it, than there is in the _Alcoran_! Now, supposing you should 'allow' all this, would it be any argument against the truth of revelation? I think not.