Yet in this we are commonly most faulty; for besides the deceits of our Passions, our Ideas of Particular Vertues and Vices, Goods and Evils, being an assemblage of divers simple Perceptions, and including several Judgments are therefore liable to mistake, and much more so considering how we commonly come by them. We hear the Word that Stands for such a Thing, suppose Honor, and then instead of enquiring what it is at the Fountain-head the Oracles of GOD, and our own, or the Impartial Reason of the Wisest and the Best, Custom and the Observations we make on the Practice of such as Pretend to it forms our Idea, which is seldom a Right one, the Opinions and Practices of the World being very fallacious, and many times quite opposite to the Dictates of Reason wou’d we but give ear to them. For what a strange distorted Idea of Honor must they needs have, who can think it Honourable to break a Vow that ought to be Kept, and Dishonourable to get loose from an Engagement that ought to be Broken? Who cannot endure to be tax’d with a Lye, and yet never think fit to keep their Word? What do they think of Greatness who support their Pomp at the Expence of the Groans and Tears of many Injur’d Families? What is their Idea of Heaven, who profess to Believe such a thing, and yet never endeavour to Qualifie themselves for the Enjoyment of it? Have they any Idea at all of these things when they speak of ’em? Or, if they have, is it not a very false one? Now that we may avoid mistake the better, and because we usually join Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free them from all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has not a Distinct Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many Ideas to one Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if our Words are Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and such, excite the same Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which is the End of Speech, and consequently how can we be Understood? And if sometimes we annex one Idea to a Word, and sometimes another, we may for ever wrangle with those who perhaps wou’d be found to agree with us if we Understood each other, but can neither Convince them, nor clear up the Matter to our own Mind. For Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were to be Chosen? Without defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word customarily apply’d to things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude in the Affirmative, meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any Corporal Loss or Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person who annexes no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might Justly contradict me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my Discourse, I shou’d without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea of Sin instead of that of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue falsly. For it is a Maxim that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a greater, if both of them be Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so,