and we chuse it to avoid a Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain there is no Comparison: But if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice be both of them Sinful, that Principle will not hold, we must Chuse neither, whatever comes on’t, Sin being Eligible no manner of way. Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any, or only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots who can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes martial them as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or understanding any thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and many fine Words, our Hearer may justly ask us what we have been saying? And what it is we wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the Good Breeding of the World, many Elegant Complements pass for nothing, they have no meaning, or if they have, ’tis quite contrary to what the Words in other Cases signifie. From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises a Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which we take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest Evidence and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least Attend may Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need not another Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement which we plainly perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of Goodness singly consider’d, we discern that they may be joyn’d together so as to form this Proposition, _That GOD is Good_: And from the evident disparity that is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to affirm this other, _That he is not Unjust_. And so long as we Judge of Nothing but what we see Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our Judgments, we may indeed in those Reasonings and Deductions we draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the Laws of Argumentation, or Negligent in the Observation of them. The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those things of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the Nature of the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to Know any thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us. Whatever we see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction always including Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include that, there being many Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which yet can’t be said to be Distinct. [Sidenote: _Les Princip. de la Philos. de M. Des Cartes._ Pt. I. §. 45.]