A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. IIMill, John Stuart
Philosophy
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
Mill, John Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Science -- Methodology
The explanation of this remarkable fact seems to lie in the following
circumstances. In the first place, all questions of position and figure
may be resolved into questions of magnitude. The position and figure of
any object are determined, by determining the position of a sufficient
number of points in it; and the position of any point may be determined
by the magnitude of three rectangular co-ordinates, that is, of the
perpendiculars drawn from the point to three planes at right angles to
one another, arbitrarily selected. By this transformation of all
questions of quality into questions only of quantity, geometry is
reduced to the single problem of the measurement of magnitudes, that is,
the ascertainment of the equalities which exist between them. Now when
we consider that by one of the general axioms, any equality, when
ascertained, is proof of as many other equalities as there are other
things equal to either of the two equals; and that by another of those
axioms, any ascertained equality is proof of the equality of as many
pairs of magnitudes as can be formed by the numerous operations which
resolve themselves into the addition of the equals to themselves or to
other equals; we cease to wonder that in proportion as a science is
conversant about equality, it should afford a more copious supply of
marks of marks; and that the sciences of number and extension, which are
conversant with little else than equality, should be the most deductive
of all the sciences.
There are also two or three of the principal laws of space or extension
which are unusually fitted for rendering one position or magnitude a
mark of another, and thereby contributing to render the science largely
deductive. First; the magnitudes of inclosed spaces, whether superficial
or solid, are completely determined by the magnitudes of the lines and
angles which bound them. Secondly, the length of any line, whether
straight or curve, is measured (certain other things being given) by the
angle which it subtends, and _vice versâ_. Lastly, the angle which any
two straight lines make with each other at an inaccessible point, is
measured by the angles they severally make with any third line we choose
to select. By means of these general laws, the measurement of all lines,
angles, and spaces whatsoever might be accomplished by measuring a
single straight line and a sufficient number of angles; which is the
plan actually pursued in the trigonometrical survey of a country; and
fortunate it is that this is practicable, the exact measurement of long
straight lines being always difficult, and often impossible, but that of
angles very easy. Three such generalizations as the foregoing afford
such facilities for the indirect measurement of magnitudes, (by
supplying us with known lines or angles which are marks of the magnitude
of unknown ones, and thereby of the spaces which they inclose,) that it
is easily intelligible how from a few data we can go on to ascertain the
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