A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. IIMill, John Stuart
Philosophy
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
Mill, John Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Science -- Methodology
§ 4. An hypothesis is any supposition which we make (either without
actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to
endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which
are known to be real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which
the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must
be, or at least is likely to be, true. If the hypothesis relates to the
cause, or mode of production of a phenomenon, it will serve, if
admitted, to explain such facts as are found capable of being deduced
from it. And this explanation is the purpose of many, if not most,
hypotheses. Since explaining, in the scientific sense, means resolving
an uniformity which is not a law of causation, into the laws of
causation from which it results, or a complex law of causation into
simpler and more general ones from which it is capable of being
deductively inferred; if there do not exist any known laws which fulfil
this requirement, we may feign or imagine some which would fulfil it;
and this is making an hypothesis.
An hypothesis being a mere supposition, there are no other limits to
hypotheses than those of the human imagination; we may, if we please,
imagine, by way of accounting for an effect, some cause of a kind
utterly unknown, and acting according to a law altogether fictitious.
But as hypotheses of this sort would not have any of the plausibility
belonging to those which ally themselves by analogy with known laws of
nature, and besides would not supply the want which arbitrary hypotheses
are generally invented to satisfy, by enabling the imagination to
represent to itself an obscure phenomenon in a familiar light; there is
probably no hypothesis in the history of science in which both the agent
itself and the law of its operation were fictitious. Either the
phenomenon assigned as the cause is real, but the law according to which
it acts, merely supposed; or the cause is fictitious, but is supposed to
produce its effects according to laws similar to those of some known
class of phenomena. An instance of the first kind is afforded by the
different suppositions made respecting the law of the planetary central
force, anterior to the discovery of the true law, that the force varies
as the inverse square of the distance; which also suggested itself to
Newton, in the first instance, as an hypothesis, and was verified by
proving that it led deductively to Kepler's laws. Hypotheses of the
second kind are such as the vortices of Descartes, which were
fictitious, but were supposed to obey the known laws of rotatory motion;
or the two rival hypotheses respecting the nature of light, the one
ascribing the phenomena to a fluid emitted from all luminous bodies, the
other (now generally received) attributing them to vibratory motions
among the particles of an ether pervading all space. Of the existence of
either fluid there is no evidence, save the explanation they are
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