[Footnote 116: “Because,” says the Regiam Majestatem, “the fruits extant and dependant upon the ground are part of the Land and ground.” (L. 1. c. 12.)] CHAP. XIX.[117] [Footnote 117: It may be here noticed, that the present chapter is one of the authorities to which Lord Coke appeals, in support of his position, that an attaint lay at common Law, both in Pleas real and personal. (2 Inst. 129, 236.)] A punishment is ordained for those who rashly swear in this Assise, and is with much propriety inserted in that Royal Institution.[118] For if the Jurors shall, by due course of Law, be convicted, or, by legal Confession, be proved to have perjured themselves in Court, they shall be despoiled of all their Chattels and Moveables, which shall be forfeited to the King, although by the great clemency of the Prince, their freehold Tenements are spared. They shall also be thrown into prison, and be there detained for one year at least. In fine, deprived for ever after of their Law, they shall justly incur the mark of perpetual infamy. This penalty is properly ordained, in order that a similarity[119] of punishment may deter Men in such a Case, from the unlawful use of an Oath. [Footnote 118: In commenting upon the Statute _de finibus levatis_, 27. Ed. 1. Mr. Barrington observes, “the Statute consists of four chapters, and the first states, the great perjury which prevailed among Jurors at this time, which offence _in a witness_ was not now punishable by any Act of Parliament; it may be perhaps thought a reflection on the common Law to assert, that this crime was totally disregarded, but yet we do not hear of any such prosecution, except the attaint of a Jury be considered as such.” (Observ. on Anc. Stat. 176.) It will not, I trust, be considered as a want of respect for the high authority in question, to observe, that the general position intended to be supported, seems to be refuted by the latter part of the passage, if, as I conceive, the _Juror_ was, in those times, of necessity a _witness_: it was part of his qualification that he was a witness, the two characters being then blended. This is, I submit, evident from the 17th chapter of the present book. A separation of character seems to have been the gradual effect of posterior times. Nor is this all. The punishment of a Juror, when guilty of perjury, appears from the present chapter of Glanville to have been imposed by an Act of Parliament. If this Act, like most, if not all, of those mentioned in the following pages, be not now extant, it is assuredly no small part of the merit of Glanville, that he has preserved the substance of those public Records, of which no other trace can be found.]