A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human KnowledgeBerkeley, George
Philosophy
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Berkeley, George
Idealism; Knowledge, Theory of; Soul
3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts,
nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind,
is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the
various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended
or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose),
cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an
intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall
attend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible
things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel
it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning
thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other
spirit actually does perceive it.[Note.] There was an odour, that is, it
was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure,
and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand
by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute
existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being
perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI,
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or
thinking things which perceive them.
[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory.]
4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed
an opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains,
rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence,
natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the
understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever
this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in
his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to
involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned
objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE
BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that
any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?
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