A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human KnowledgeBerkeley, George
Philosophy
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Berkeley, George
Idealism; Knowledge, Theory of; Soul
6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to
prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what
follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,
concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this
matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice
of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate
and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties
in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind
has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is
not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must
needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract
ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of
those sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all
that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime
learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such
a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is
well acquainted with them.
7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the
qualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY
ITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and
blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind
being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other
qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself
abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object
extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind
resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself,
exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour,
and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without
extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the
idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both
colour and extension.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account