To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phænomenon;
which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give
rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one
is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their
correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least
traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of
sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where they have never
been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form
to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having
actually tasted it.
There is however one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that it
is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent
impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several
distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds,
which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other,
though at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different
colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same
colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the
rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual
gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote
from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different,
you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose
therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and
to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,
excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never
has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of
that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending
gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will
perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, said will be sensible,
that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous
colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,
from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to
himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be
of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple
ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though
the instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth
our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our
general maxim.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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