329. It is constituted by relations, which are not impressions at all; and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to ‘system of judgment’. 330. Not seeing this, Hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit. 331. But if so, ‘system of judgment’ must consist of feelings constantly experienced; 332. ... which only differ from remembered feelings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded. But how can it have faded, if they have been constantly repeated? 333. Inference then can give no new knowledge. 334. Nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new phenomena, while it can prove relations, previously unknown, between phenomena. Such a distinction inadmissible with Hume. 335. His distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature, as determining inference. 336. But this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away. 337. Laws of nature are unqualified habits of expectation. 338. Experience, according to his account of it, cannot be a parent of knowledge. 339. His attitude towards doctrine of thinking substance. 340. As to Immateriality of the Soul, he plays off Locke and Berkeley against each other, and proves Berkeley a Spinozist. 341. Causality of spirit treated in the same way. 342. Disposes of ‘personal’ identity by showing contradictions in Locke’s account of it. 343. Yet can only account for it as a ‘fiction’ by supposing ideas which with him are impossible. 344. In origin this ‘fiction’ the same as that of ‘Body’. 345. Possibility of such fictitious ideas implies refutation of Hume’s doctrine. SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS of the GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO VOL. II. 1. Hume’s doctrine of morals parallel to his doctrine of nature. 2. Its relation to Locke: Locke’s account of freedom, will, and desire. 3. Two questions: Does man always act from the strongest motive? and, What constitutes his motive? The latter the important question. Distinction between desires that are, and those that are not, determined by the conception of self. 4. Effect of this conception on the objects of human desire. 5. Objects so constituted Locke should consistently exclude: But he finds room for them by treating every desire for an object, of which the attainment gives pleasure, as a desire for pleasure. 6. Confusion covered by calling ‘happiness’ the general object of desire. 7. ‘Greatest sum of pleasure’ and ‘Pleasure in general’ unmeaning expressions. 8. In what sense of happiness is it true that it ‘is really just as it appears?’ In what sense that it is every one’s object? 9. No real object of human desire can ever be just as it appears. 10. Can Locke consistently allow the distinction between true happiness and false? Or responsibility? 11. Objections to the Utilitarian answer to these questions.