A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method Into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method Into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Hume, David
Emotions; Ethics; Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English
190. If such idealism were Berkeley’s, his inference from the
‘ideality’ of the real to spirit and God would be more valid than
it is. To have got rid of the notion that the world first exists
and then is thought of--to have seen that it only really exists as
thought of--is to have taken the first step in the only possible
‘proof of the being of God,’ as the self-conscious subject in
relation to which alone an intelligible world can exist, and the
presence of which in us is the condition of our knowing it. [1] But
there is nothing to show that in adopting coherence as one test,
among others, of the reality of ideas, he attached to it any of the
significance exhibited above. He adopted it from ordinary language
without considering how it affected his view of the world as a
succession of feelings. That still remained to him a sufficient
account of the world, even when he treated it as affording intuitive
certainty of a soul ‘naturally immortal,’ and demonstrative certainty
of God. He is not aware, while he takes his doctrine of such
certainty from Locke, that he has left out, and not replaced, the
only solid ground for it which Locke’s system suggested.
[1] See above, paragraphs 146 and 149-152.
His view of the soul as ‘naturally immortal’.
191. The soul or self, as he describes it, does not differ from
Locke’s ‘thinking substance,’ except that, having got rid of
‘extended matter’ altogether, he cannot admit with Locke any
possibility of the soul’s being extended, and, having satisfied
himself that ‘time was nothing abstracted from the succession
of ideas in the mind,’ [1] he was clear that ‘the soul always
thinks’--since the time at which it did not think, being abstracted
from a succession of ideas, would be no time at all. A soul which is
necessarily unextended and therefore ‘indiscerptible,’ and without
which there would be no time, he reckons ‘naturally immortal.’
[1] ‘Principles of Human Knowledge,’ sec. 98.
Endless succession of feelings is not immortality in true sense.
Berkeley’s doctrine of matter fatal to a true spiritualism;
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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