[1] ‘The taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of colour and tangibility, and ... ’tis certain they are always co-existent. Nor are they only co-existent in general, but also cotemporary in their appearance in the mind.’ p. 521. (Contrast p. 370, where existence and appearance are identified.) [Book I, part IV., sec. V. and part II, sec. IV.] The thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be. 242. In fact, however, when he speaks of the feeling, which is called extension, as a quality of the feeling, which is called sight, of the table, he has not even the excuse that he might have had if the feelings in question, being of different senses, might be cotemporary. According to him they are feelings of the same sense. The extension of the table he took to be a datum of sight just as properly as its colour; yet he cannot call it the same as colour, but only ‘a quality of the coloured object.’ As the ‘coloured object,’ however, apart from ‘propensities to feign,’ can, according to him, be no other than the feeling of colour, his doctrine can only mean that, colour and extension being feelings of the same sense, the latter is a quality of the former. Is this any more possible than that red should be a quality of blue, or a sour taste of a bitter one? Must not the two feelings be successive, however closely successive, so that the one which is object will have disappeared before the other, which is to be its quality, will have occurred? [1] [1] It should be needless to point out that by taking extension to be a quality of ‘tangibility’ or muscular effort we merely change the difficulty. The question as to its relation to such feelings will be simply a repetition of that, put in the text, as to its relation to the feeling of colour. Hume equivocates by putting ‘coloured points’ for colour.