5. But if the same were propounded in _England_, _viz._ if an aliquot part of every Landlords Rent were excinded or retrenched, then those whose Rents were settled, and determined for long times to come, would chiefly bear the burthen of such an Imposition, and others have a benefit thereby. For suppose _A._ and _B._ have each of them a parcel of Land, of equal goodness and value; suppose also that _A._ hath let his parcel for twenty one years at twenty pound _per annum_, but that _B._ is free; now there comes out a Taxe of a fifth part; hereupon _B._ will not let under 25_l._ that his remainder may be twenty, whereas _A._ must be contented with sixteen neat; nevertheless the Tenants of _A._ will sell the proceed of their bargain at the same rate, that the Tenants of _B._ shall do. The effect of all this is; First, that the Kings fifth part of _B._ his Farm, shall be greater then before. Secondly, that the Farmer to _B._ shall gain more then before the Taxe. Thirdly, that the Tenant or Farmer of _A._ shall gain as much as the King and Tenant to _B._ both. Fourthly, the Tax doth ultimately light upon the Landlord _A._ and the Consumptioners. From whence it follows, that a Land-taxe resolves into an irregular Excize upon consumptions, that those bear it most, who least complain. And lastly, that some Landlords may gain, and onely such whose Rents are predetermined shall loose; and that doubly, _viz._ one way by the raising of their revenues, and the other by enhansing the prices of provisions upon them. 6. Another way is an _Excisum_ out of the Rent of Houseing, which is much more uncertain then that of Land. For an House is of a double nature, _viz._ one, wherein it is a way and means of expence; the other, as ’tis an Instrument and Tool of gain: for a Shop in _London_ of less capacity and less charge in building then a fair Dining-Room in the same House, unto which both do belong, shall nevertheless be of the greater value; so also shall a Dungeon, Sellar, then a pleasant Chamber; because the one is expence, the other profit. Now the way of a Land-taxe rates housing, as of the latter nature, but the Excize, as of the former. 7. We might adde hereunto, that housing is sometimes disproportionally taxed to discourage Building, especially upon new Foundations, thereby to prevent the growth of a City; suppose _London_, such excessive and overgrown Cities being dangerous to Monarchy, though the more secure when the Supremacy is in Citizens of such places themselves, as in _Venice_. 8. But we say, that such checking of new Buildings signifies nothing to this purpose; for as much as Buildings do not encrease, until the People already have increased: but the remedy of the abovementioned dangers is to be sought in the causes of the encrease of People, the which if they can be nipt, the other work will necessarily be done.