The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill, without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usually successful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general at Austerlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeing the French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to the Allies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping to fire. So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried the height of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, in spite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit. General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troops sustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing "confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces." V.--Defence against Infantry. 1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its proper defensive formation is in _deployed lines_. 2. Avoid a _premature commencement_ of the fire. Long firing exhausts the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy. 3. So, a fire upon an enemy while _under cover_, as in a wood, would be virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any loss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, according to circumstances. 4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time a _musketry fire at a distance_, is highly objectionable, as it causes a great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this space at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy; for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive, while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course, different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are exposed. 5. But in _special cases_, as where we have to cover a flank movement of our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without regard to losses received. 6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are _very strong objections_ to it.