Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and not suitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy is advancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it from absolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, or even three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up in support. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to have taught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, he posted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty paces behind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage of keeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the more important one of concentration of force. But this was only his formation for defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack were always in close columns. 14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients to accelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to which columns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions. As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns, each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a single column four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish the loss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But in compensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:-- (1.) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken or obstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals between the columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, a dangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correct intervals. (2.) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means of forming square, except by passing through an intermediate formation. (3.) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through which cavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear. The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested by Marshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but not necessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point of Infantry Tactics. 15. The manoeuvre of _Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions_ is obnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to Division Columns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have no intermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square, they would have to face into column and close to half distance, which there would often not be time to do. In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, the subdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, and thus be exposed to a destructive enfilade.