This manœuvre was covered by the use of dense smoke screens, and the pressure on the German fleet was relieved at once. Admiral Scheer states that “the enemy did not follow our veer around,” and he strongly insists that the British should have held firmly to his line by executing a similar manœuvre. But he really gives the true state of the case when he writes: “It may be that the leader did not grasp the situation.” In fact none of the British commanders realized what had taken place under cover of that smoke screen. After the sinking of the _Invincible_, although Vice Admiral Beatty was reported as turning to starboard, there was no further aggressive action on his part--and, in the next fifteen minutes (6.50), he signaled the two remaining battle cruisers of the Third Squadron to take station astern of the last ship of his line, the _New Zealand_. At the same time (6.50) the Grand Fleet, which had completed deployment at 6.38, altered course to south by divisions to close. These movements of the British forces naturally did not succeed in bringing any pressure upon the Germans, as Admiral Scheer’s whole fleet was then safely on a westerly course, as a result of the simultaneous swing-around of his line--and the German fleet was concealed by dense smoke screens, which left the British in ignorance of Scheer’s manœuvre. Encouraged by this successful result of his move, and finding his ships all able to keep their places in the line, “fully prepared to fight,” (S) the German Admiral decided upon an unexpected course of action. His change of tactics was so remarkable that his reasons should be quoted at length: “It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us, our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving him to decide when he could elect to meet us the next morning. There was but one way of averting this--to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night.” (S)