A True Account of the Battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916Frothingham, Thomas Goddard
History
A True Account of the Battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916
Frothingham, Thomas Goddard
Jutland, Battle of, 1916; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
“At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of
torpedoboat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness
made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a
view to its safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal of
action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain between the enemy
and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would
afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same
time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.”
Concerning this stage of the action Admiral Jellicoe in his report
quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as follows: “In view of the gathering
darkness and the fact that our strategical position was such as to
make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight
under most favorable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or
proper to close the enemy battle-fleet during the dark hours.”
Here the British Admiral and his subordinate were in accord, but of
course the responsibility for the movements of the British fleet
rested with Admiral Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief. By his order the
British fleet steamed through the dark hours on southerly courses “some
eighty-five miles” (J) from the battlefield. Although the British fleet
was thus placed in the general direction of Heligoland, this meant that
Admiral Jellicoe relinquished contact, in a military sense, with the
German fleet. At the time it was undoubtedly Lord Jellicoe’s intention
to renew the action the next day, but it must be clearly understood
that this was to be in every way a new naval battle--not a battle
continued by keeping in touch with his enemy and reëxerting his force
on the following day.
Admiral Jellicoe himself is explicit upon this point, and states
that “at 9 P.M.” he ordered his fleet “to alter course by divisions
to _south_, informing the Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet,
the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding
destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they should
conform.” (J) Nothing could be more definitely established than the
fact that this broke off the action of fleets in every real sense of
the word. The British light craft were to conform to the movements of
the Battle Fleet, and there was no hint of maintaining a screen or
contact that would develop the position of the enemy fleet.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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