[22] “Jellicoe was sending out radio instructions at the rate of two a minute--while von Scheer made only _nine_ such signals during the whole battle. This I learn on credible testimony.” Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U.S.N. Sir Percy Scott, as already quoted, bluntly states: “The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an action at night. The German Fleet was.” To this should be added the statement that the British fleet was not prepared in methods in advance to cope with the conditions of the afternoon of May 31. The German fleet was. Herein lay the chief cause for failure to gain a decision, when the one great opportunity of the war was offered to the British fleet. In the three decades before The World War great strides had been made in naval development, with only the unequal fighting in the American War with Spain and in the East to give the tests of warfare. In this period it is probable that at different times first one navy would be in the lead and then another. It was the misfortune of the British in the Battle of Jutland that the Germans, at that time, were better prepared in equipment and rehearsed methods for an action under the existing conditions. This should be recognized as an important factor--and the failure to win a decision should not be wholly charged against the men who fought the battle. The destroyer came to its own in the Battle of Jutland as an auxiliary of the battle fleet, both for offense and defense. The whole course of the action proved that a screen of destroyers was absolutely necessary. For offense, it might be argued truthfully that, of the great number of torpedoes used, very few hit anything. The _Marlborough_ was the only capital ship reported struck in the real action,[23] and she was able afterward to take some part in the battle, and then get back to her base. But above all things stands out the fact that it was the threat of night torpedo attacks by German destroyers, and the desire to safeguard the British capital ships from these torpedo attacks, which made the British fleet withdraw from the battlefield, and break off touch with the German fleet. Lord Jellicoe states that he “rejected at once the idea of a night action” on account of “first the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers.” (J) [23] The _Pommern_ was sunk in the night after the action of fleets had been broken off.