With all due allowance for interference and damage to the wireless, especially on the _Lion_, it is hard to see why Lord Jellicoe should have been so badly informed as to the positions of the ships engaged, and why definite information should have been so long delayed. In this important phase of the tactics of the battle we are forced to the conclusion that all means had not been taken to insure the coördination of the British advance force and the Grand Fleet through linking up ships and other methods. This disposition of the British forces had often been used, and the logical aim of the sweep of the North Sea was to find and engage the enemy. Yet, when the enemy actually was found, it became evident that methods had not been developed for using the whole British force as parts of one great manœuvre. With the uncertain information that Admiral Jellicoe possessed as to what was going on, any such joint manœuvre could only have taken place through a miracle of luck. As a matter of fact, there was an error of twelve miles to the eastward in location. * * * * * After the turn to the north, in the running fight in pursuit of Vice Admiral Beatty’s force, the German fleet was approaching the British Grand Fleet, which drew near in the increasing mist. To understand the course of the action at this critical stage, the reader should realize that the Germans possessed a fleet manœuvre which had been carefully rehearsed for such a contingency, in sudden contact with a superior enemy force. This was a simultaneous “swing-around” (S) of all the ships of the fleet, to turn the line and bring it into an opposite course. Admiral Scheer emphasizes the pains that had been taken to develop the ability to carry out this manœuvre, which had before been considered impracticable for a fleet in action. “At our peace manœuvres great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of the signals.” (S) He is certainly justified in adding the statement that “the trouble spent was now well repaid,” as the German Admiral was by this means enabled to carry out an unexpected and very effective manœuvre on two occasions when his fleet would have been in cramped positions without this recourse. Admiral Scheer was also able to use this identical manœuvre in an attack. The British did not have any idea that the German Command would be able to carry out this change of direction of the German line. Consequently, in the smoke and mist, these thrice-executed movements were not suspected by the British. With such an important part of the German tactics unnoticed, and not taken into account in relation to the British movements, the reasons are evident that make necessary a new story of these phases of the action.