The menacing approach of the French cavalry, who rode amongst and round our squares, was not quietly witnessed by our own horsemen: we made many spirited charges between the allied squares, as well as on every side of them. All the British, German, and Tripp’s Dutch-Belgian cavalry, that were between the two high-roads, were more or less engaged during these attacks. At times it was quite amusing to see some of the foreign troops cut away from the angles of their squares, and our staff officers galloping after them to intercept their flight. It was surprising to see how readily they returned to their squares. The fire of volleys from our squares did no great damage; the independent file-firing was the most destructive to the enemy’s cavalry, to such particularly as were not clad in steel or brass. The killed and wounded men and horses, the broken guns, etc., afforded excellent cover to the skirmishers, whilst they impeded the movements of the horsemen, and augmented their disorder and confusion. It is not difficult to conceive from the foregoing circumstances, what was the rage, the ungovernable fury that animated those attacks; and how, after unceasing combats for above two hours, in a limited space, no result was obtained by the French but a most horrible and bloody-carnage. It was one of the greatest of their errors, on that eventful day, to get their cavalry into a labyrinth from which there was no extricating it before the pride of their fifteen thousand horsemen had been completely broken. It was now evident, from the enemy’s attacks becoming less animated and frequent, that they began to see the utter folly of their attempts against our invincible infantry. It is, in my opinion, very doubtful, whether the enemy’s cavalry ever came into actual collision with our squares[45]. It has been said by Napoleon, and it is also the remark of most the French writers, that Guyot went into action without orders. Napoleon dispatched general Bertrand to stop the heavy cavalry of the guard; but they were so engaged that a retrograde movement would have then been dangerous. “This,” Napoleon observed, “had deprived him of a cavalry reserve at about five o’clock, because they went two hours sooner than they should have gone into action, and that the same troops well employed had many times gained him a victory.” I cannot reconcile myself to the idea that a division of cavalry would go into action without orders; it is much more probable that there was some mistake in the transmission of them: but why was not the advance countermanded? Most of their cavalry movements were so slow towards the end of the day, in consequence of the jaded condition of their horses, and the saturated and encumbered state of the ground, that an order sent on foot might have soon brought them back.